Sale Agreement Limitation Period

Subject to what is set out here, your aunt may give or transfer the dwelling if a 30-year period has elapsed since she and your uncle were in possession of the dwelling and no right can be invoked, since the maximum time in which a person can sue in a competent court with respect to a property is 30 years, in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of Limitations of 1963. We understand that the initial agreement on the sale/transportation agreement through which the dwelling was acquired was not stamped or registered. If the original seller (the person who sold the apartment to your uncle/tata) is alive, it will be advisable to execute with him an agreement stipulating that neither he nor anyone claiming by him has a right, title and interest in the apartment. We also understand that even if your aunt`s name is the first name in the sales number, it was your uncle who bought the apartment. Since he did not bequeath the apartment to your aunt, it is possible that his other legal heirs (for example. B his children) could claim a share of the apartment (even more so if your uncle`s name was the second name in the sales number). In the most recent case of Murphy v. Joe O`Toole – Sons Ltd- Anor [2014] IEHC 486, Baker J. found that the limitation period for a merchandise sale agreement ran from the date of delivery of the goods and not from the date the parties entered into the contract.

The judge found that under section 1 of the Property Sales Act in 1893, « the delivery of goods and the simultaneous obligation to pay the goods are the point at which the contract or sale agreement becomes a sale and, if there was one, occurred during execution or delivery, when the contract was no longer enforceable, but was executed. » This agreement should then be attached to the donation/transfer copy. Note that your father`s title is still subject to the non-fee due to the non-registration of the sales letter. The applicant submitted that he was within six years of the july 2008 stay of proceedings on the grounds (i) that the delay did not begin to run until the time of delivery of the machine, namely in October 2002, for breach of contract; (ii) the contract was conditional on the financing of the lease-sale and the evidence indicates that the financing was not obtained until October 2002 and that this period only began to run when the condition was met; and (iii) the requirement of negligence he suffered when he suffered injury or loss which, in his view, was either the date of delivery or the financing agreement (Hegarty/O`Loughran [1990] 1 IR 148).